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VACATING AWARDS UNDER THE 
WISCONSIN ARBITRATION ACT AND THE 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
RALPH ANZIVINO* 
Arbitration has become one of the primary means for parties to 
resolve their legal disputes.  Unlike a court proceeding, however, the 
grounds for vacating an arbitration award are quite narrow and specific.  
The purpose of this Article is to identify and explain the five major ways 
to vacate an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act and the 
Wisconsin Arbitration Act.  The first way is to challenge whether the 
parties contractually agreed to arbitrate the dispute.  The specific 
challenge is to the scope of the contract or the scope of the arbitration 
clause in the contract.  The second is to show that the other party was 
involved in some type of conduct involving corruption, fraud, or undue 
means that impacted the arbitration award.  The third is to prove that the 
arbitrator was evidently partial and, thus, a fair and impartial arbitrator 
did not decide the award.  The fourth is to establish that the arbitrator 
committed some type of administrative misconduct in conducting the 
arbitration.  Finally, the fifth is to prove that the arbitrator misused his 
power and, thereby, exceeded his authority.  Each of the grounds is 
analyzed in detail, with case examples to enhance one’s understanding. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration has become one of the mainstays for resolving legal 
disputes.  Virtually every type of dispute and every area of the law lends 
itself to resolution by arbitration.  In addition, it is not necessary that an 
attorney be a litigator in order to competently participate in arbitration.  
There are no rules of evidence, there are no juries, discovery is often 
very limited, the hearing is private, and attorneys are generally given a 
very wide berth in presenting their case to the arbitrator.  As a result, 
most attorneys, including ones who consider themselves to be 
transactional lawyers, will be involved in some type of arbitration. 
The primary arbitration statute under federal law is the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA),1 and in Wisconsin it is the Wisconsin 
Arbitration Act (WAA).2  The statutes are virtually identical, so cases 
decided under one statute are persuasive authority for the other in the 
absence of a conflicting precedent.3  The FAA or the WAA will govern 
virtually every arbitration conducted in Wisconsin, unless the parties’ 
contract states otherwise.4  For example, any contract that provides 
“Wisconsin law shall control” or similar language will be arbitrated 
under the WAA.5 
Unfortunately, there may be occasions when the attorney and client 
believe the arbitrator’s award should be vacated.  Unlike an appeal of a 
court decision, where the appellate courts are free to view the 
application of the law to the facts in a different way than the lower 
court, the review of an arbitrator’s award by a reviewing court is 
significantly different.  The purpose of this Article is to identify and 
explain the various ways that an attorney can seek to have an 
arbitrator’s award vacated before it is confirmed by a court.  A 
subsequent article will address the issue of seeking relief from the 
arbitrator’s award once it has become a judgment by court confirmation. 
There are five primary ways to get an arbitrator’s award vacated.  
The first is to challenge whether the parties ever agreed to arbitrate a 
matter.  This typically involves either challenging the existence or 
validity of a contract to arbitrate, or the scope of the arbitration clause, 
 
1.  9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). 
2.  See WIS. STAT. §§ 788.01–.18 (2013–2014). 
3.  Marlowe v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 2012 WI App 51, ¶ 9, 340 Wis. 2d 594, 811 
N.W.2d 894; Steichen v. Hensler, 2005 WI App 117, ¶ 14, 283 Wis. 2d 755, 701 N.W.2d 1. 
4.  See 9 U.S.C. § 2; WIS. STAT. § 788.01. 
5.  WIS. STAT. § 788.01. 
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if there is a contract between the parties.  This is called substantive 
arbitrability.  The second is to show that the other party was involved in 
some type of conduct involving corruption, fraud, or undue means that 
impacted the arbitration award.  The third is to prove that the arbitrator 
was evidently partial and, thus, a fair and impartial arbitrator did not 
decide the award.  The fourth is to establish that the arbitrator 
committed some type of administrative misconduct in conducting the 
arbitration.  Examples would be failing to admit evidence or denying an 
adjournment request.  Finally, the last ground is to prove that the 
arbitrator misused his power and thereby exceeded his authority.  An 
arbitrator misuses his power by perversely misconstruing his authority, 
manifestly disregarding the law, or issuing an award that is against 
public policy. 
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
As a basic proposition, Wisconsin courts take “a ‘hands off’ 
approach to arbitration awards.”6  The primary function of a reviewing 
court is to assure the parties that they received the arbitration they 
agreed to in their contract.7  The general rule followed by the courts is 
not to overturn an arbitrator’s award even if there has been serious 
error.8  It is not a sufficient ground to vacate an award simply because 
the arbitrator’s decision is wrong or based on an error of law or fact.9  
Rather, there must be extraordinary circumstances to vacate an award.10  
In addition, any ground to vacate an award must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence.11  Finally, absent fraud, a party unhappy with an 
arbitration award cannot seek discovery from an arbitrator to secure 
 
6.  Grambow v. Associated Dental Servs., Inc., No. 94-1735, 1996 WL 5638, at *2, 199 
Wis. 2d 522, 546 N.W.2d 578 (Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1996) (per curiam, unpublished table decision) 
(quoting City of Madison v. Madison Prof’l Police Officers Ass’n, 144 Wis. 2d 576, 587, 425 
N.W.2d 8, 12 (1988)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
7.  Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. Dist. Council 48, No. 85-0821, 1985 Wisc. App. 
LEXIS 3957, at *4, 128 Wis. 2d 556, 381 N.W.2d 621 (Dec. 4, 1985) (unpublished table 
decision). 
8.  Greendale Educ. Ass’n v. Greendale Sch. Dist., No. 01-3234, 2002 WL 31455693, ¶ 8, 
2003 WI App 1, 259 Wis. 2d 481, 655 N.W.2d 546 (Nov. 5, 2002) (per curiam, unpublished 
table decision). 
9.  Id. ¶ 12. 
10.  Id. ¶ 9. 
11.  DeBaker v. Shah, 194 Wis. 2d 104, 117, 533 N.W.2d 464, 468 (1995). 
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evidence in the hope of vacating the arbitrator’s award.12  As a further 
indication of limited judicial review of arbitration awards, Wisconsin has 
adopted the Steelworkers Trilogy when addressing labor contract 
disputes.13 
Courts “will not relitigate issues submitted to arbitration.”14  When 
reviewing an arbitrator’s award, a court is not entitled to consider new 
evidence on the merits of the award.15  Further, even newly discovered 
evidence is not a sufficient ground to re-litigate the dispute.16 
Courts have concluded that “arbitration is not litigation.”17  
However, when reviewing an arbitrator’s award, the doctrines of res 
judicata18 and collateral estoppel19 have been applied to arbitrations.20  
One court noted that a prior fact-finding arbitration is res judicata on a 
subsequent arbitration between the same parties.21  Those doctrines, 
however, will not be considered if the arbitrator’s award goes beyond 
the submission of the contract.22  Similarly, the doctrines of claim23 and 
 
12.  Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 2008 WI App 116, ¶ 19, 313 Wis. 2d 
93, 756 N.W.2d 461. 
13.  Denhart v. Waukesha Brewing Co., 17 Wis. 2d 44, 51–52, 115 N.W.2d 490, 494 
(1962); see also City of Madison v. AFSCME, 124 Wis. 2d 298, 302, 369 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Ct. 
App. 1985). 
14.  McLaughlin v. Hoffman, No. 2009AP624, 2010 WL 347908, ¶ 8, 2010 WI App 46, 
324 Wis. 2d 306, 784 N.W.2d 183 (Feb. 2, 2010) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
15.  Barnard v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., No. 88-0600, 1988 WL 148354, at *3, 148 Wis. 2d 
948, 437 N.W.2d 235 (Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1988) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
16.  Id. 
17.  Badger Contracting, Inc. v. Harwood, No. 99-0824, 2000 WL 486262, ¶ 7, 2000 WI 
App 116, 235 Wis. 2d 275, 616 N.W.2d 524 (Apr. 26, 2000) (unpublished table decision). 
18.   
An affirmative defense barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on 
the same claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of 
transactions and that could have been—but was not—raised in the first suit. . . .  
The three essential elements are (1) an earlier decision on the issue, (2) a final 
judgment on the merits, and (3) the involvement of the same parties, or parties in 
privity with the original parties. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1504 (10th ed. 2014) [hereinafter BLACK’S] (res judicata). 
19.  “A doctrine barring a party from relitigating an issue determined against that party 
in an earlier action, even if the second action differs significantly from the first one.”  Id. at 
318 (collateral estoppel). 
20.  Manu-Tronics, Inc. v. Effective Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 163 Wis. 2d 304, 311, 471 N.W.2d 
263, 266 (Ct. App. 1991). 
21.  Local 366 v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., No. 82-1739, 1983 WL 161544, at *2, 
114 Wis. 2d 595, 338 N.W.2d 527 (Ct. App. July 11, 1983) (unpublished table decision). 
22.  Id. at *3. 
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issue preclusion24 are applicable to successive arbitration decisions, the 
same as successive litigation, because the policies underlying 
arbitration—of a speedy, final decision—support the application of 
these doctrines.25  Finally, the doctrine of judicial estoppel26 has also 
been applied in an arbitration setting.  Where a party to arbitration 
claimed that an arbitration clause was unconscionable, the court applied 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel because it was that party who invoked 
the arbitration clause in the first place.27 
III.  SUBSTANTIVE ARBITRABILITY 
Substantive arbitrability is the first issue considered by the courts 
when deciding whether to vacate an arbitrator’s award.28  There are two 
issues that comprise substantive arbitrability.  The first issue is whether 
the parties have consented to arbitration through a written agreement.29  
Interestingly, the statute does not provide for enforcement of an oral 
agreement to arbitrate but rather only a written one.30  The second issue 
 
23.  The rule of claim preclusion is that any claims that were brought or could have been 
brought in an earlier litigation between the parties must be brought in the first action or be 
barred.  18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4406, at 138 (2d ed. 2002). 
24.  The rule of issue preclusion is that “a right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue 
and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot 
be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies.”  Id. § 4416, at 387 
(quoting S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48 (1897)). 
25.  Dane Cnty. v. Dane Cnty. Union Local 65, 210 Wis. 2d 267, 279, 565 N.W.2d 540, 
545 (Ct. App. 1997).  The minimum requirements for application of the preclusion doctrines 
are that “the claim, or the issue . . . decided in the first arbitration is the same” issue or claim 
in the second arbitration, “the parties are the same, the parties have had a full opportunity to 
argue their respective positions,” and “the parties have not agreed to re-submit the claim or 
the issue . . . to a second arbitration.”  Id. at 280. 
26.  “Estoppel that prevents a party from contradicting previous declarations made 
during the same or an earlier proceeding if the change in position would adversely affect the 
proceeding or constitute a fraud on the court.”  BLACK’S, supra note 18, at 668 (judicial 
estoppel). 
27.  Pegues v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. 2008AP1500, 2009 WL 454672, ¶ 18, 2009 WI 
App 41, 316 Wis. 2d 774, 766 N.W.2d 242 (Feb. 25, 2009) (per curiam, unpublished table 
decision). 
28.  Tri-Cnty. Invs., LLC v. Toney Law Offices, S.C., No. 2007AP195, 2008 WL 426233, 
¶ 12, 2008 WI App 51, 309 Wis. 2d 234, 747 N.W.2d 527 (Feb. 19, 2008) (per curiam, 
unpublished table decision). 
29.  Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, LLP v. Bosben, No. 2011AP1862, 2013 WL 627247, 
¶ 7, 2013 WI App 41, 346 Wis. 2d 730, 828 N.W.2d 592 (Feb. 21, 2013) (per curiam, 
unpublished table decision). 
30.  See WIS. STAT. §§ 788.02–.03 (2013–2014). 
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is, if they have such an agreement, whether the subject matter of the 
dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement or clause.31  
The test utilized by the courts in making such a determination is 
whether the court can “determine with reasonable certainty that there 
was a ‘common intent’ to submit that particular issue to arbitration.”32  
Essentially, the court must determine whether the arbitrator’s analysis 
came from the essence of the contract.33 
The parties in their written agreement can refer issues of 
arbitrability to the arbitrator, but the courts require a “clear 
demonstration of that purpose.”34  As a general rule, the courts indicate 
that an arbitrator should not “be the judge of the scope of his . . . 
authority . . . unless” the parties’ contract “clearly and unmistakably 
grant[s] the arbitrator such authority.”35  In the event that the 
arbitrability issue is submitted to the arbitrator, the court will not 
overturn the arbitrator’s decision on arbitrability unless it can be said 
with “positive assurance” that the language defining the arbitral issue is 
not susceptible to the arbitrator’s interpretation.36  Further, the courts 
will “resolve any doubts in favor of coverage.”37  In other words, if the 
parties’ written contract does not expressly provide that the arbitrator 
can decide issues of arbitrability, any arbitrator decision on arbitrability 
is subject to judicial de novo review without any deference to the 
 
31.  Id.; Superior Cranberry Creek Landfill Negotiating Comm. v. State Waste Facility 
Siting Bd., No. 2003AP3167, 2005 WL 1981272, ¶ 7, 2005 WI App 214, 287 Wis. 2d 506, 704 
N.W.2d 423 (Aug. 18, 2005) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
32.  Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. City of Milwaukee, No. 99-2069, 2000 WL 705353, 
¶ 9, 200 WI App 161, 238 Wis. 2d 94, 617 N.W.2d 677 (June 1, 2000) (unpublished table 
decision) (quoting Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 202 
Wis. 2d 673, 681, 552 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
33.  Id. ¶ 9. 
34.  Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Jefferson Educ. Ass’n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 102, 253 N.W.2d 536, 
540–41 (1977) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 
U.S. 574, 583 n.7 (1960)); Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2011 WI App 14, 
¶ 11, 331 Wis. 2d 188, 795 N.W.2d 777. 
35.  Hudec Law Offices, S.C. v. Esser, 2003 WL 22998535, ¶ 8, 2004 WI App 21, 269 Wis. 
2d 543, 674 N.W.2d 681 (Dec. 23, 2003) (per curiam, unpublished table decision) (citing 
AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)). 
36.  Cirilli v. Country Ins. & Fin. Servs., 2009 WI App 167, ¶ 14, 322 Wis. 2d 238, 776 
N.W.2d 272 (quoting AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650); Superior Cranberry, 2005 WL 1981272, 
¶ 7 (quoting Madison Landfills, Inc. v. Libby Landfill Negotiating Comm., 188 Wis. 2d 613, 
634, 524 N.W.2d 883, 892 (1994)). 
37.  Superior Cranberry, 2005 WL 1981272, ¶ 7 (quoting Madison Landfills, Inc., 188 
Wis. 2d at 634). 
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arbitrator’s decision.38  On the other hand, if the parties’ written 
agreement does provide that the arbitrator can decide issues of 
arbitrability, then the arbitrator’s decision will be granted the normal 
deference.39 
There is no procedure defined in the statutes or prescribed by the 
courts for raising the issue of substantive arbitrability.40  As a practical 
matter, the issue will be raised depending upon whether a party has 
initiated court litigation.  If litigation has already been initiated, upon 
application of one of the parties, the court shall stay the trial of the 
action until arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement.41  Before referring the matter to arbitration, the court must 
be satisfied that the issue involved in the suit or proceeding is properly 
referred to arbitration under the parties’ agreement.42  Therefore, prior 
to referral, the court will necessarily decide substantive arbitrability. 
In the event that litigation in court has not been initiated between 
the parties, the party opposing arbitration has several choices available 
on how to raise the issue of substantive arbitrability.  First, the party 
opposing arbitration can simply refuse to participate in the arbitration.43  
Second, the opposing party could seek an injunction against the 
arbitration.44  And third, the party opposing arbitration could decide to 
submit to the arbitration while preserving the objection to substantive 
arbitrability for subsequent de novo judicial review.45 
The best choice is simply to refuse to participate in the arbitration.  
By refusing to participate in the arbitration process, the refusing party 
thereby forces the moving party to seek a court order to arbitrate.46  The 
exclusive remedy for a party’s refusal to arbitrate is to compel 
arbitration through a court order, and the failure to do so constitutes a 
waiver of substantive arbitrability should the moving party choose to 
 
38.  Madison Teachers Inc. v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 2004 WI App 54, ¶ 10, 271 
Wis. 2d 697, 678 N.W.2d 311. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Scholl v. Lundberg, 178 Wis. 2d 259, 264, 504 N.W.2d 115, 117 (Ct. App. 1993). 
41.  9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 788.02 (2013–2014). 
42.  9 U.S.C. § 3; WIS. STAT. § 788.02. 
43.  Scholl, 178 Wis. 2d at 264–65. 
44.  Id. at 264. 
45.  Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Jefferson Educ. Ass’n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 106–07, 253 N.W.2d 
536, 542–43 (1977). 
46.  9 U.S.C. § 4; WIS. STAT. § 788.03. 
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proceed without complying with the statute.47  As part of the process to 
compel arbitration, “[t]he court shall hear the parties, and upon being 
satisfied that” substantive arbitrability is not an issue “shall make an 
order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration.”48  Seeking an 
injunction would place the burden of proof on the moving party and is 
also contrary to the exclusive remedy provided for a party’s refusal to 
arbitrate.  Finally, the third choice is needlessly wasteful in that the 
court does not finally resolve the substantive arbitrability issue until the 
arbitration process is completed. 
A cautionary note is that partial participation in the arbitration 
process without a reservation of rights can be deemed a waiver of the 
substantive arbitrability issue.49  Courts have held that where one party 
participates in preliminary arbitration procedures in preparation for a 
hearing on the merits, that party is indicating to the other that it intends 
to fully participate in the process and thereby waives the substantive 
arbitrability issue.50  Where a party raised the issue of substantive 
arbitrability three and one-half months after the petition was filed 
compelling arbitration, and after having participated in the arbitrator 
selection process, the court held the party was estopped from raising the 
substantive arbitrability issue.51 
Also, a challenge to substantive arbitrability must be made to the 
arbitrator, or it will be waived.52  Where a party challenged an 
arbitrator’s award in court on the basis that the opposing party failed to 
produce a written contract whereby the parties agreed to arbitrate the 
dispute, but failed to raise that issue before the arbitrator, the court held 
the substantive arbitrability issue was waived.53  Similarly, where a party 
sought attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest as part of an arbitration 
 
47.  State ex rel. Carl v. Charles, 71 Wis. 2d 85, 90, 237 N.W.2d 29, 31 (1976). 
48.  9 U.S.C. § 4; WIS. STAT. § 788.03. 
49.  Pilgrim Inv. Corp. v. Reed, 156 Wis. 2d 677, 685, 457 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Ct. App. 
1990). 
50.  Id. at 685–86. 
51.  Id. at 686–87. 
52.  MBNA Am. Bank v. Gilbertson, No. 2004AP1071, 2005 WL 1119749, ¶ 13, 2005 WI 
App 126, 284 Wis. 2d 569, 699 N.W.2d 252 (May 11, 2005) (per curiam, unpublished table 
decision) (citing DePue v. Mastermold, Inc., 161 Wis. 2d 697, 703–04, 468 N.W.2d 750, 752 
(Ct. App. 1991)). 
53.  MBNA Am. Bank, 2005 WL 1119749, ¶ 13. 
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award, the court held that those issues were waived since they were not 
brought before the arbitrator who granted the award.54 
Finally, an arbitrator does not have “the power to consolidate claims 
[that arise] under separate arbitration contracts absent an agreement to 
do so, even if consolidation” would resolve the claims more efficiently.55  
An arbitrator, however, can order consolidation of claims through an 
implicit agreement if the way the parties framed the issues evidenced an 
agreement to consolidate the claims.56 
IV. CORRUPTION, FRAUD, OR UNDUE MEANS 
A court will vacate an arbitrator’s award if it “was procured by 
corruption, fraud, or undue means.”57  There are essentially three 
requirements that must be satisfied in order to have an award vacated 
on the basis of corruption, fraud, or undue means.  First, the aggrieved 
party must establish the improper conduct.58  Second, there must be a 
nexus between the improper conduct and the arbitrator’s award.59  And 
third, the aggrieved party must prove that the improper conduct was not 
discoverable prior to the award.60 
The first requirement is to fit the alleged improper conduct into the 
appropriate statutory category.  Corruption is not defined in the statute 
or case law.  Fraud, on the other hand, is a well-traveled road and 
understood to be a “knowing misrepresentation or concealment of a 
material fact to induce another to act to his . . . detriment.”61  A simple 
example would be obtaining an arbitration award as a result of perjured 
 
54.  Badger Contracting, Inc. v. Harwood, No. 99-0824, 2000 WL 486262, ¶¶ 2, 8, 2000 
WI App 116, 235 Wis. 2d 275, 616 N.W.2d 524 (Apr. 26, 2000) (unpublished table decision). 
55.  Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 202 Wis. 2d 673, 
683, 552 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1996). 
56.  Id. at 684. 
57.  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (2012); WIS. STAT. § 788.10(1)(a) (2013–2014). 
58.  Pegues v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. 2008AP1500, 2009 WL 454672, ¶ 11, 2009 WI 
App 41, 316 Wis. 2d 774, 766 N.W.2d 242 (Feb. 25, 2009) (per curiam, unpublished table 
decision). 
59.  Id. ¶ 15. 
60.  Pegues, 2009 WL 454672, ¶¶ 15–16; Steichen v. Hensler, 2005 WI App 117, ¶¶ 14–
15, 283 Wis. 2d 755, 701 N.W.2d 1; Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104, 
109 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff’d, 653 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1981). 
61.  BLACK’S, supra note 18, at 775. 
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testimony.62  Conflicting affidavits by the same person, however, do not 
establish fraud but simply a conflict in testimony.63 
Undue means is understood to be “an attempt to influence the 
arbitrators through inappropriate, unjustified or improper methods.”64  
“[I]t clearly connotes behavior that is immoral if not illegal.”65  “[M]ere 
sloppy or overzealous lawyering,” however, does not constitute “undue 
means.”66  Since the term follows corruption and fraud, courts indicate 
that it “should be known by the company it keeps.”67  As such, it is 
understood to mean “underhanded or conniving ways of procuring an 
award.”68  Bad faith is required.69  An intentional malfeasance would be 
another fair description.70  Where evidence was admitted during an 
arbitration of a party’s arrest record, despite a state statute barring such 
evidence, such conduct did not qualify as undue means.71 
The second requirement is that there must be a nexus between the 
improper conduct and the arbitrator’s award.72  The basis of the nexus 
requirement is that the statute provides for vacatur only where the 
award is procured by improper means.73  As such, the courts have read 
this language to require a nexus between the improper conduct and the 
award.74  The nexus, however, does not require that the aggrieved party 
establish that the award would have been different had the improper 
conduct not occurred.75  But, there must be some nexus between the 
improper conduct and the award.  Where an arbitrator premised his 
 
62.  Hood v. Laskaris, No. 84-1293, 1985 WL 188257, at *3, 126 Wis. 2d 510, 375 N.W.2d 
219 (Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1985) (per curiam, unpublished table decision) (citing Dogherra v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
63.  Hood, 1985 WL 188257, at *3. 
64.  Pegues, 2009 WL 454672, ¶ 15. 
65.  A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1992). 
66.  Id. 
67.  Nat’l Cas. Co. v. First State Ins. Grp., 430 F.3d 492, 499 (1st Cir. 2005). 
68.  Id. 
69.  Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104, 108 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff’d, 
653 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1981). 
70.  Id. 
71.  Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 52 F.3d 359, 361–62 (D.C. Cir. 
1995). 
72.  Pegues v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. 2008AP1500, 2009 WL 454672, ¶ 15, 2009 WI 
App 41, 316 Wis. 2d 774, 766 N.W.2d 242 (Feb. 25, 2009) (per curiam, unpublished table 
decision). 
73.  Forsythe Int’l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Tex., 915 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990). 
74.  Id. 
75.  Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 2015] VACATING ARBITRATION AWARDS 1643 
award on grounds clearly independent of issues related to the fraud, 
there was no nexus between the fraud and the award.76  Similarly, where 
an expert witness perjured himself as to his credentials but the witness’s 
testimony concerned only relatively minor issues in the arbitration, the 
fraud was not sufficient to vacate the arbitrator’s award.77 
Finally, the aggrieved party must prove that the improper conduct 
was not discoverable prior to the award.78  Where a party moved to 
vacate an arbitration award on the basis of fraud but during the 
arbitration stated that he suspected that the opposing party had falsified 
documents, the court concluded that the fraud was discoverable by due 
diligence prior to the issuance of the award and thereby vitiated the 
basis of his motion.79  Similarly, where evidence was improperly 
destroyed prior to the arbitration and the aggrieved party was aware of 
the improper destruction, the aggrieved party was unable to use that 
improper conduct as a ground for vacatur because it was well known to 
all parties involved prior to the arbitration.80 
V. EVIDENT PARTIALITY 
An arbitration award will be vacated where there is evidence of 
evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrator.81  The 
policy behind vacating an arbitration award where the arbitrator has 
been evidently partial is to protect “fundamental fairness.”82  The parties 
to the process must believe that a disinterested arbitrator will make the 
award.83 
 
76.  Id. 
77.  Peabody v. Rotan Mosle, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1135, 1137–38 (M.D. Fla. 1987). 
78.  Id. at 1138; Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104, 109 (N.D. Ill. 
1980), aff’d, 653 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1981). 
79.  Lafarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 
1339 (9th Cir. 1986). 
80.  Pegues v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. 2008AP1500, 2009 WL 454672, ¶ 16, 2009 WI 
App 41, 316 Wis. 2d 774, 766 N.W.2d 242 (Feb. 25, 2009) (per curiam, unpublished table 
decision). 
81.  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2)(2012); WIS. STAT. § 788.10(1)(b) (2013–2014). 
82.  Diversified Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Slotten, 119 Wis. 2d 441, 446, 351 N.W.2d 176, 179 
(Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Catz Am. Co. v. Pearl Grange Fruit Exch., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 549, 
552 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)) (internal quotation mark omitted), quoted in Tri-Cnty. Invs., LLC v. 
Toney Law Offices, S.C., No. 2007AP195, 2008 WL 426233, ¶ 24, 2008 WI App 51, 309 Wis. 
2d 234, 747 N.W.2d 527 (Feb. 19, 2008) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
83.  Richco Structures v. Parkside Vill., Inc., 82 Wis. 2d 547, 557, 263 N.W.2d 204, 210 
(1978). 
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Whether an arbitrator has exhibited evident partiality is a question 
of law to be determined de novo by the court.84  The required burden of 
proof standard is by clear and convincing evidence.85 
The definition of evident partiality is not simply proof that an 
arbitrator has an interest in the outcome of the proceeding or “proof 
that a relationship exists between the arbitrator and a party or a party’s 
representative which is so substantial that the arbitrator’s . . . [partiality] 
may be inferred.”86  The definition is more nuanced. 
“‘[E]vident partiality’ exists . . . when a reasonable person knowing 
the previously undisclosed information would have . . . doubts regarding 
the impartiality of the arbitrator . . . .”87  One court has noted that the 
doubt must be a serious doubt about the arbitrator’s partiality.88  “[T]he 
standard is not simply that a reasonable person, upon learning of the 
undisclosed information, would have investigated further.”89  Rather, 
the standard is whether a reasonable person, after further investigation, 
would have concluded that partiality is likely.90  One court has best 
captured the meaning by noting that the phrase “evident partiality” 
should be “broadly construed to mean ‘evidence of possible partiality,’ 
rather than narrowly construed to mean ‘partiality is self evident.’”91 
A neutral arbitrator “must disclose at the outset” of the arbitration 
any relationship or transaction that the arbitrator “has had with the 
parties or with the representatives of the parties to the arbitration 
proceeding.”92  Also, “the neutral arbitrator must disclose any facts 
which might indicate to a reasonable person that the arbitrator . . . might 
. . . have an interest in the outcome of the arbitration.93  Finally, the 
neutral arbitrator must disclose any fact or information, which might 
reasonably support “the appearance of the existence of any bias, 
 
84.  DeBaker v. Shah, 194 Wis. 2d 104, 112, 533 N.W.2d 464, 466 (1995). 
85.  Id. at 117. 
86.  Richco Structures, 82 Wis. 2d at 557–58. 
87.  DeBaker, 194 Wis. 2d at 116–17 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation mark 
omitted). 
88.  Borst v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WI 70, ¶ 3, 291 Wis. 2d 361, 717 N.W.2d 42. 
89.  DeBaker, 194 Wis. 2d at 116–17. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Sch. Dist. of Spooner v. Nw. United Educators, 136 Wis. 2d 263, 271, 401 N.W.2d 
578, 582 (1987). 
92.  Richco Structures v. Parkside Vill., Inc., 82 Wis. 2d 547, 558, 263 N.W.2d 204, 211 
(1978). 
93.  Id. 
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prejudice, partiality, or the absence of impartiality.”94  The arbitrator’s 
failure to disclose any of these facts or relationships is proof of evident 
partiality.95  Even matters that are in the public record must be 
disclosed.96 
Full disclosure, however, is not a declaration of impartiality.97  
Rather, the purpose of full disclosure is to minimize and hopefully 
eliminate litigation whereby the court is asked to determine whether the 
relationship or information is insignificant and inconsequential, or 
whether it is substantial.98  It is much better to get these issues resolved 
on the front end rather than the back end of the arbitration.  Wisconsin 
clearly adopts a preference for pre–arbitration challenges.99  Once full 
disclosures are made, “a party may seek the removal of a challenged 
arbitrator under the general equity powers of the . . . court.”100  The 
court, thereby, may order the selection of another arbitrator “if the 
court determines the challenged arbitrator demonstrates ‘evident 
partiality.’”101 
Finally, it is preferable to let the parties “gauge the arbitrator’s . . . 
predilection” for partiality, rather than the courts.102  A party’s “failure 
to . . . object based on the information disclosed prior to the arbitration” 
will likely “act as a forfeiture of any subsequent post-arbitration 
challenge [based] on the disclosed information.”103 
VI. ARBITRATOR MISCONDUCT 
An arbitration award will be vacated if the arbitrator is guilty of 
misconduct in conducting the hearing, including refusing to postpone 
the hearing without good cause, refusing to hear pertinent and material 
evidence, or any other behavior that may have prejudiced a party’s 
rights.104  Stated more succinctly, arbitrator misconduct occurs when an 
arbitrator fails to exercise reasonable discretion when conducting the 
 
94.  Id. 
95.  Id. at 559. 
96.  DeBaker v. Shah, 194 Wis. 2d 104, 119, 533 N.W.2d 464, 469 (1995). 
97.  Borst v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WI 70, ¶ 3, 291 Wis. 2d 361, 717 N.W.2d 42. 
98.  Richco Structures, 82 Wis. 2d at 560. 
99.  Borst, 2006 WI 70, ¶ 35. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. 
102.  Richco Structures, 82 Wis. 2d at 560–61. 
103.  Borst, 2006 WI 70, ¶ 36. 
104.  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2012); WIS. STAT. 788.10(1)(c) (2013–2014). 
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arbitration.  Allegations of arbitrator misconduct take many forms.  For 
example, allegations of arbitrator misconduct have included the failure 
to record the hearing,105 the failure to grant an adjournment,106 the 
failure to produce a reasoned award,107 the refusal to admit evidence,108 
ex parte contact by the arbitrator,109 the lack of legal analysis in an 
award,110 the refusal to view a construction site,111 the refusal to stay a 
hearing, and the failure to swear in a witness.112  Every allegation of 
arbitrator misconduct must be brought before the arbitrator, or it will be 
deemed waived by the courts.113 
Mistakes of judgment of either facts or law are generally not grounds 
for vacating an award.114  The complaining party must investigate the 
misconduct and present some evidence to support the claim.115  In order 
to establish arbitrator misconduct, it is necessary to have a record of the 
arbitration proceeding.116  As a general rule, however, if there is no 
requirement in the contract, the arbitrator is not required to record the 
hearing.117  In the event there is no hearing transcript, the court will 
presume the presence of every fact necessary to support the arbitrator’s 
 
105.  Hayett v. Kemper Sec., Inc., No. 96-2424, 1997 WL 768921, at *2, 216 Wis. 2d 113, 
573 N.W.2d 899 (Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1997) (unpublished table decision). 
106.  Tri-Cnty. Invs., LLC v. Toney Law Offices, S.C., No. 2007AP195, 2008 WL 426233, 
¶ 9, 2008 WI App 51, 309 Wis. 2d 234, 747 N.W.2d 527 (Feb. 19, 2008) (per curiam, 
unpublished table decision). 
107.  Navarro v. Lake Grp., Inc., No. 91-1142, 1992 WL 70490, at *1, 167 Wis. 2d 487, 
482 N.W.2d 669 (Ct. App. Feb. 19, 1992) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
108.  Lake States, Inc. v. Walia, No. 99-1033, 2000 WL 1114485, ¶ 7, 2000 WI App 214, 
238 Wis. 2d 841, 618 N.W.2d 273 (Aug. 1, 2000) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).  
109.  Navarro, 1992 WL 70490, at *1.  
110.  Breen v. Winkel, No. 95-2677, 1996 WL 252962, at *4, 202 Wis. 2d 651, 551 N.W.2d 
64 (Ct. App. May 14, 1996) (unpublished table decision). 
111.  Richco Structures v. Parkside Vill., Inc., No. 82-1069, 1983 WL 161650, at *1, 113 
Wis. 2d 722, 334 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. Apr. 22, 1983) (per curiam, unpublished table 
decision). 
112.  Mattson v. Schultz, No. 95-2837, 1996 WL 208192, at *1, 201 Wis. 2d 817, 549 
N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1996) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
113.  Fett v. Luksetich, No. 96-0839, 1997 WL 199942, at *4, 210 Wis. 2d 497, 568 N.W.2d 
321 (Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1997) (unpublished table decision). 
114.  Richco Structures, 1983 WL 161650, at *2. 
115.  Navarro v. Lake Grp., Inc., No. 91-1142, 1992 WL 70490, at *3, 167 Wis. 2d 487, 
482 N.W.2d 669 (Ct. App. Feb. 19, 1992) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
116.  Carey v. Ablan, No. 03-1930, 2004 WL 252010, ¶ 6, 2004 WI App 68, 271 Wis. 2d 
820, 677 N.W.2d 733 (Feb. 12, 2004) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
117.  Navarro, 1992 WL 70490, at *1. 
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decision.118  An affidavit cannot be used as a substitute for a transcript.119  
Where an arbitration was conducted under the rules of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), which required the 
arbitrator to record all hearings, the failure of the arbitrator to record a 
hearing was held not to be misconduct.120  Similarly, where an arbitrator 
indicated to the parties that he would get a court reporter for the 
hearing but failed to do so, such conduct did not amount to 
misconduct.121 
The form of the arbitrator’s award has also led to allegations of 
misconduct.  Specifically, it has been alleged that the lack of legal 
analysis in an award is a basis to vacate the award.122  The courts, 
however, have rejected such an argument.123  In fact, the arbitrator is not 
required to produce a reasoned award unless a statute or the parties’ 
contract requires one.124 
Arbitrators should generally be very cautious about excluding or 
limiting evidence.  However, an arbitrator did not commit misconduct 
when the arbitrator denied the admission of evidence because the party 
paid its administrative fees late and the party “failed to timely submit 
. . . [the] documents . . . [the party] intended to use at the hearing.”125  
Also, an arbitrator’s refusal to view an allegedly defective construction 
site was not misconduct where the request was made after the close of 
the hearing.126 
Requests for stays and adjournments are common and difficult 
issues in arbitration.  This decision always involves balancing competing 
 
118.  Grutzner, S.C. v. Church, No. 94-3128-FT, 1995 WL 109129, at *1, 192 Wis. 2d 767, 
532 N.W.2d 471 (Ct. App. Mar. 16, 1995) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
119.  Id. 
120.  Hayett v. Kemper Sec., Inc., No. 96-2424, 1997 WL 768921, at *2, 216 Wis. 2d 113, 
573 N.W.2d 899 (Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1997) (unpublished table decision). 
121.  Tri-Cnty. Invs., LLC v. Toney Law Offices, S.C., No. 2007AP195, 2008 WL 426233, 
¶ 27, 2008 WI App 51, 309 Wis. 2d 234, 747 N.W.2d 527 (Feb. 19, 2008) (per curiam, 
unpublished table decision). 
122.  Breen v. Winkel, No. 95-2677, 1996 WL 252962, at *4, 202 Wis. 2d 651, 551 N.W.2d 
64 (Ct. App. May 14, 1996) (unpublished table decision). 
123.  Id. 
124.  Navarro v. Lake Grp., Inc., No. 91-1142, 1992 WL 70490, at *1, 167 Wis. 2d 487, 
482 N.W.2d 669 (Ct. App. Feb. 19, 1992) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
125.  Lake States, Inc. v. Walia, No. 99-1033, 2000 WL 1114485, ¶¶ 7–8, 2000 WI App 
214, 238 Wis. 2d 841, 618 N.W.2d 273 (Aug. 1, 2000) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
126.  Richco Structures v. Parkside Vill., Inc., No. 82-1069, 1983 WL 161650, at *2, 113 
Wis. 2d 722, 334 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. Apr. 22, 1983) (per curiam, unpublished table 
decision). 
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interests.  Where a court ruled that an arbitrator did not commit 
misconduct by failing to grant an adjournment, the court identified 
various factors that must be considered by the arbitrator, including any 
“previous request for . . . [adjournment], how long the . . . [arbitration] 
ha[s] been pending, . . . the reasons for the requested continuance,” and 
whether any of the parties will be prejudiced.127  In a similar situation, 
no misconduct was found when an arbitrator refused to stay a hearing in 
order to await the outcome of an underlying lawsuit or to allow a 
witness from out of state to return and testify.128  Essentially, the court 
will support the arbitrator’s decision provided the arbitrator exercises 
reasonable discretion.129 
Although generally prohibited, even ex parte contact between the 
arbitrator and a party has been held not to be misconduct.130  Finally, the 
failure of an arbitrator to swear in a witness has been held not to be a 
sufficient basis to vacate an award.131 
VII.ARBITRATOR MISUSE OF POWER 
An arbitration award will be vacated when the arbitrator exceeds his 
powers or so imperfectly executes his powers that a mutual, final, and 
definite award has not been made.132  When an arbitrator misuses his 
powers, the courts characterize the arbitrator’s conduct as exceeding his 
authority.133  There are three different ways that an arbitrator can 
misuse his powers or exceed his authority.  First, the arbitrator can 
construe the parties’ agreement in such a perverse way that he commits 
a perverse misconstruction.134  Second, the arbitrator misuses his 
 
127.  Tri-Cnty. Invs., LLC v. Toney Law Offices, S.C., No. 2007AP195, 2008 WL 426233, 
¶ 22, 2008 WI App 51, 309 Wis. 2d 234, 747 N.W.2d 527 (Feb. 19, 2008) (per curiam, 
unpublished table decision) (quoting Brief of Defendant-Appellant Toney Law Offices, S.C. 
at 25, Tri-Cnty. Invs., LLC v. Toney Law Offices, S.C., No. 2007AP195 (Feb. 19, 2008), 2007 
WL 7259693). 
128.  Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, LLP v. Bosben, No. 2011AP1862, 2013 WL 
627247, ¶ 11, 2013 WI App 41, 346 Wis. 2d 730, 828 N.W.2d 592 (Feb. 21, 2013) (per curiam, 
unpublished table decision). 
129.  Id. 
130.  Navarro v. Lake Grp., Inc., No. 91-1142, 1992 WL 70490, at *3, 167 Wis. 2d 487, 
482 N.W.2d 669 (Ct. App. Feb. 19, 1992) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
131.  Mattson v. Schultz, No. 95-2837, 1996 WL 208192, at *2, 201 Wis. 2d 817, 549 
N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1996) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
132.  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012); WIS. STAT. § 788.10(1)(d) (2013–2014). 
133.  Racine Cnty. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Dist. 10, 2008 WI 
70, ¶ 11, 310 Wis. 2d 508, 751 N.W.2d 312. 
134.  Id. 
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authority when he manifestly disregards the law in arriving at his 
award.135  And third, if the arbitrator’s award violates public policy, the 
arbitrator has misused his power.136  Any allegation of misuse of power 
must be raised before the arbitrator or the issue will be waived.137  It is a 
question of law whether an arbitrator has misused his power.138 
The public policy limitation on the authority of an arbitrator is not 
enumerated in the statute.139  Nevertheless, courts have concluded that 
an arbitrator’s award must be consistent with public policy in order to be 
sustained.140  Those courts that have supported the public policy 
limitation have done so on the basis that the arbitrator’s award must 
satisfy the standards set by statute and also those developed at common 
law.141 
A. Perverse Misconstruction 
An arbitrator commits a “perverse misconstruction” of a contract 
when the arbitrator’s interpretation is so implausible that it is totally and 
absolutely not supported by the contract language or contract 
construction principles, and devoid of any foundation in reason.142  
When the court is reviewing an arbitrator’s award, the court is not to 
decide which construction of the contract is the more reasonable one.143  
Rather, the arbitrator’s award must “be upheld if there is some 
reasonable foundation” for the award.144  If the court does not find a 
 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id.; Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., No. 2011 WI App 14, ¶ 8, 331 
Wis. 2d 188, 795 N.W.2d 777. 
137.  Fett v. Luksetich, No. 96-0839, 1997 WL 199942, at *4, 210 Wis. 2d 497, 568 N.W.2d 
321 (Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1997) (unpublished table decision). 
138.  Wausaukee Sch. Dist. v. Wausaukee Educ. Ass’n, No. 2011AP1716, 2012 WL 
1623504, ¶ 15, 342 Wis. 2d 251, 816 N.W.2d 351 (Ct. App. May 10, 2012) (unpublished table 
decision); Milwaukee Police Supervisors’ Org. v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI App 59, ¶ 20, 
341 Wis. 2d 361, 815 N.W.2d 391. 
139.  See WIS. STAT. § 788.10(d) (2013–2014). 
140.  Racine Cnty., 2008 WI 70, ¶ 11. 
141.  Fett, 1997 WL 199942, at *3; Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s London, 202 Wis. 2d 673, 689, 552 N.W.2d 420, 426 (Ct. App. 1996). 
142.  Wausaukee Sch. Dist., 2012 WL 1623504, ¶ 24; City of Antigo v. Antigo City 
Emps.’ Union Local 1192, No. 89-0296, 1989 WL 112305, at *2, 151 Wis. 2d 786, 447 N.W.2d 
395 (Ct. App. July 25, 1989) (unpublished table decision). 
143.  Baldwin–Woodville Area Sch. Dist. v. W. Cent. Educ. Ass’n—Baldwin Woodville 
Unit, 2009 WI 51, ¶ 22, 317 Wis. 2d 691, 766 N.W.2d 591. 
144.  Milwaukee Police Supervisors’ Org. v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI App 59, ¶ 20, 
341 Wis. 2d 361, 815 N.W.2d 391 (quoting Baldwin–Woodville, 2009 WI 51, ¶ 22) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
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reasonable foundation, then the courts conclude that the arbitrator has 
exceeded his authority.145  The rationale used by the courts when they 
vacate an arbitrator’s award on the basis of a perverse misconstruction is 
that the court is protecting the parties’ contract.146 
It is proper for an arbitrator to interpret the parties’ contract but not 
to modify it.147  An arbitrator is “without authority to . . . modify plain 
and unambiguous” terms of the parties’ contract.148  Unfortunately, 
there is no bright-line test for distinguishing between interpreting a 
contract and modifying it.149  Interpreting an ambiguous contract or term 
is within an arbitrator’s authority.150  An arbitrator interprets a contract 
when there is ambiguity in the contract.  The test used by the courts to 
evaluate the arbitrator’s decision that the parties’ contract was 
ambiguous is whether the language in question could rationally be 
viewed as ambiguous.151  Once it is determined that the contract 
language is ambiguous, the arbitrator is free to choose between the 
reasonable alternative constructions of the language and thereby does 
not commit a perverse misconstruction.152  The court will uphold the 
arbitrator’s decision as long as the court finds support for the 
arbitrator’s award in the contract, notwithstanding that the court might 
have reached a different result.153  Where the parties’ contract provided 
for the award of “consequential damages,” the arbitrator’s decision on 
 
145.  Baldwin–Woodville, 2009 WI 51, ¶ 23; Milwaukee Police Supervisors’ Org., 2012 
WI App 59, ¶ 20. 
146.  Baldwin–Woodville, 2009 WI 51, ¶ 39 (Prosser, J., dissenting). 
147.  Wis. Law Enforcement Ass’n, Local 1 v. State Dep’t of Transp., 2010 WI App 27, 
¶ 18, 323 Wis. 2d 444, 780 N.W.2d 170. 
148.  Fluor Bros. Constr. Co. v. City of De Pere, No. 84-466, 1984 WL 180247, at *1, 121 
Wis. 2d 698, 359 N.W.2d 181 (Ct. App. Oct. 9, 1984) (unpublished table decision). 
149.  City of Antigo v. Antigo City Emps.’ Union Local 1192, No. 89-0296, 1989 WL 
112305, at *3, 151 Wis. 2d 786, 447 N.W.2d 395 (Ct. App. July 25, 1989) (unpublished table 
decision). 
150.  Id. 
151.  Local 236 Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am. v. City of Madison, No. 01-1506, 2002 
WL 576397, ¶ 25, 2002 WI App 134, 255 Wis. 2d 832, 646 N.W.2d 854 (Apr. 18, 2002) 
(unpublished table decision); Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., No. 94-1256, 
1995 WL 128497, at *3, 192 Wis. 2d 763, 532 N.W.2d 469 (Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1995) (per 
curiam, unpublished table decision). 
152.  Fluor Bros. Constr. Co., 1984 WL 180247, at *2. 
153.  Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. City of Milwaukee, No. 99-2069, 2000 WL 705353, 
¶ 8, 200 WI App 161, 238 Wis. 2d 94, 617 N.W.2d 677 (June 1, 2000) (unpublished table 
decision); Oshkosh Paraprofessional Educ. Ass’n v. Oshkosh Area Sch. Dist., No. 95-0133, 
1995 WL 702403, at *3, 198 Wis. 2d 388, 542 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1995) (per 
curiam, unpublished table decision). 
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what damages naturally and directly flowed from the breach were 
beyond the court’s review.154  Where an arbitrator found the language 
“full duties and responsibilities” to be ambiguous and thereby 
interpreted the phrase, the court upheld the arbitrator’s interpretation 
as one that had a foundation in reason.155  Also, where a contract was 
silent on whether “arbitration” meant the arbitrator should conduct a de 
novo hearing or a certiorari-type hearing, the arbitrator’s decision that 
the language intended a de novo hearing was upheld.156  Finally, where a 
contract provided that a party was entitled to “basic due process,” the 
arbitrator’s interpretation of such phrase was within the arbitrator’s 
purview and “not a perverse misconstruction of the contract.”157 
A common tool used by arbitrators when interpreting ambiguous 
contract language is to analyze the parties’ past practices.  This 
technique is consistent with contract analysis, which provides that the 
parties’ prior course of dealing158 or course of performance159 or both are 
part of their current contract.160  The prior course of dealing and course 
of performance are the parties’ past practices.  These past practices must 
be unequivocal, readily ascertainable, and clearly established between 
the parties.161 
Where a contract is ambiguous or silent on an issue, an “arbitrator 
does not alter or modify [the] contract by drawing upon the past 
 
154.  Ackerman v. Mason Bldg. Sys., Inc., No. 92-2608, 1993 WL 404316, at *2–3, 179 
Wis. 2d 850, 514 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1993) (per curiam, unpublished table 
decision). 
155.  Local 236 Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am., 2002 WL 576397, ¶¶ 13–15. 
156.  Fortney v. Sch. Dist. of W. Salem, No. 80-1447, 1981 WL 139207, at *5, 104 Wis. 2d 
737, 313 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1981) (unpublished table decision). 
157.  Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. Serv. Emps.’ Int’l Union, Local 152, 158 Wis. 2d 51, 58, 
462 N.W.2d 214, 216 (Ct. App. 1990). 
158.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223(1) (1979) (“A course of dealing is 
a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to an agreement which is fairly to be 
regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions 
and other conduct.”); see also WIS. STAT. §§ 401.205(1), .303(2) (2013–2014). 
159.  A course of performance is a sequence of conduct concerning the current contract 
between the parties that can be useful in interpreting the parties’ contract.  See WIS. STAT. 
§ 401.303(1). 
160.  See id. § 401.201(2)(b); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 cmt. a 
(1979). 
161.  Cf. City of Antigo v. Antigo City Emps.’ Union Local 1192, No. 89-0296, 1989 WL 
112305, at *3, 151 Wis. 2d 786, 447 N.W.2d 395 (Ct. App. July 25, 1989) (unpublished table 
decision). 
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practice[s]” between the parties to resolve the dispute.162  However, it is 
critical that the arbitrator determines and finds in his award that the past 
practice has continued under the current contract.163  The failure of the 
arbitrator to make such a finding will cause the court to vacate the 
arbitrator’s award because it “does not draw its essence” from the 
contract.164  For example, in City of Madison v. AFSCME,165 the city 
ordered several city employees not to report for duty on a holiday.166  
The union objected to the city’s order on the basis that the parties had a 
past practice that permitted employees to request not to work on a 
holiday.167  When the matter was submitted to arbitration, the arbitrator 
found that this practice was well established and the city had made no 
effort to seek to change it during contract negotiations.168  Therefore, 
the past practice had become part of the parties’ contractual relationship 
even though the matter was not expressly in the contract.  Proof of a 
past practice necessarily avoids a claim of perverse misconstruction. 
Two of the more common issues facing an arbitrator that are 
challenged as a perverse misconstruction are the award of attorney’s 
fees and punitive damages.  Wisconsin follows the American rule when 
it comes to the award of attorney’s fees to a successful party.169  The 
American rule provides that attorney’s fees must be authorized by the 
parties’ contract or by a statute.170  Further, if the authorization is to 
come from a statute, the statutory authority must be express, not 
implied.171  Where an arbitrator awarded attorney’s fees to a successful 
party and neither the contract nor any statute expressly provided for 
 
162.  Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., No. 94-1256, 1995 WL 128497, 
at *3, 192 Wis. 2d 763, 532 N.W.2d 469 (Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1995) (per curiam, unpublished 
table decision) (citing City of Madison v. AFSCME, 124 Wis. 2d 298, 303, 369 N.W.2d 759, 
762 (Ct. App. 1985)); Wis. Law Enforcement Ass’n, Local 1 v. State Dep’t of Transp., 2010 
WI App 27, ¶ 19, 323 Wis. 2d 444, 780 N.W.2d 170. 
163.  Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. City of Milwaukee, No. 83-704, 1984 WL 180625, 
at *1, 118 Wis. 2d 824, 349 N.W.2d 110 (Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1984) (per curiam, unpublished 
table decision). 
164.  Id. at *2. 
165.  124 Wis. 2d 298, 369 N.W.2d 759 (Ct. App. 1985). 
166.  Id. at 300. 
167.  Id. 
168.  Id. 
169.  Milwaukee Teacher’s Educ. Ass’n v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 147 Wis. 2d 791, 
796–97, 433 N.W.2d 669, 671 (Ct. App. 1988). 
170.  Id.  
171.  Id. 
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such authority, the arbitrator exceeded his authority.172  On the other 
hand, where the parties’ contract provided that the arbitration was to be 
conducted under the rules of the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA), whose rules permitted the award of attorney’s fees if authorized 
by law, and a state statute authorized attorney’s fees for the issue in 
arbitration, the arbitrator’s award of fees was upheld.173  The court 
further noted that, even though the statute provided that a “court” 
could award attorney’s fees, the arbitrator’s award of attorney’s fees was 
upheld.174  Further, the same rule applies for the award of attorney’s fees 
when seeking to confirm an arbitrator’s award with the circuit court or 
on appeal from a circuit court decision.175  The parties’ contract or a 
statute must authorize the award of such attorney’s fees under those 
specific circumstances.176 
It is an open question in Wisconsin whether an arbitrator can award 
punitive damages.  There are three views taken by courts regarding 
whether an arbitrator can award punitive damages.  The first view, 
supported by the federal courts under the FAA, is that arbitrators are 
empowered to award punitive damages unless the arbitration agreement 
states to the contrary.177  The rationale underlying this view is that the 
ability to award punitive damages is needed to provide the arbitrator 
with the ability to award complete relief as mandated by the facts.178  In 
other words, if the facts are such that a court could award punitive 
damages, then an arbitrator should have the same ability.179  The second 
view is that the award of punitive damages is solely a function of the 
court, and arbitrators do not have the power to award punitive damages, 
even if the parties’ agreement would allow them.180  The rationale 
supporting the second view is that “arbitration arises out of a 
contractual relationship,” and parties are unable by contract to benefit 
 
172.  Id. at 797–98. 
173.  Winkelman v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 2005 WI App 25, ¶ 17, 279 Wis. 2d 335, 693 
N.W.2d 756. 
174.  Id. 
175.  Id. ¶ 45. 
176.  Id. ¶ 17. 
177.  Raytheon Co. v. Automated Bus. Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 1989); see also 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995). 
178.  Raytheon Co., 882 F.2d at 12. 
179.  Id. 
180.  U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1983). 
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from or be penalized by the award of punitive damages.181  The third 
view provides that punitive damages may be awarded by an arbitrator 
but only when there is an express provision authorizing such relief in the 
arbitration agreement.182  The rationale supporting this view is that 
punitive damages are relatively rare in contract disputes and, as such, 
such a drastic remedy should not be implied without express 
authorization in the contract.183 
The leading case in Wisconsin on the ability of an arbitrator to 
award punitive damages is Winkelman v. Kraft Foods, Inc.184  
Winkleman was a farmer who was awarded punitive damages by an 
arbitrator as a result of fraudulent statements made by an agent of Kraft 
Foods.185  When Winkleman submitted the arbitrator’s award to the 
circuit court for confirmation, the circuit court affirmed the arbitrator’s 
award of compensatory damages but denied the punitive damage 
award.186  Winkleman appealed the circuit court’s denial of the punitive 
damage award.187  The appeals court acknowledged the three 
approaches taken by various jurisdictions on this issue.188  However, the 
court declined to choose between the three views.189  Rather, the court 
concluded that it was the arbitrator’s decision to choose which view of 
the parties’ contract the arbitrator would accept, and having done so by 
selecting the first view, the court would not vacate the arbitrator’s award 
of punitive damages.190  Therefore, in the absence of a statutory or 
judicial declaration on the matter, an arbitrator is free to choose 
between the three views when deciding whether to award punitive 
damages. 
The first view does appear to be the better reasoned one.  Where a 
factual circumstance is such that an award of punitive damages is 
justified, it should not matter whether the tribunal is a court or 
arbitration.  If such were the case, a party could use arbitration as a 
means to escape full responsibility for his fraudulent or underhanded 
 
181.  Id. 
182.  Complete Interiors, Inc. v. Behan, 558 So. 2d 48, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
183.  Id. 
184.  2005 WI App 25, 279 Wis. 2d 335, 693 N.W.2d 756. 
185.  Id. ¶¶ 5–6. 
186.  Id. ¶ 6. 
187.  Id. ¶ 1. 
188.  Id. ¶ 24. 
189.  Id. ¶ 25. 
190.  Id. 
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conduct.  The second view suggests that the parties are unable to 
contract for the provision of punitive damages.  In the absence of some 
recognized defense to contract formation, such as unconscionability, 
duress, or the like, there seems to be no legal or logical basis for denying 
parties the right to enter into any contract they choose, including one 
that provides for the potential of punitive damages.  Finally, the third 
view suggests that because punitive damages are rare in a contract 
dispute, punitive damages need to be expressly authorized.  However, 
simply because something only rarely happens does not mean, nor 
should it mean, that when it does happen, a court or tribunal is not able 
to address fully the matter.  Otherwise, arbitration is not a full and fair 
substitute for litigation. 
B. Manifest Disregard of the Law 
A court may not overturn an arbitration award simply because an 
arbitrator makes an error of law.191  Rather, the arbitrator’s award must 
show “a manifest disregard of the law.”192  There are two ways that an 
arbitrator’s award can be vacated on the ground that it is in manifest 
disregard of the law.  First, an arbitrator commits a manifest disregard 
for the law when the arbitrator makes “no attempt to apply or [even] 
interpret the relevant . . . law.”193  Second, an award will be vacated on 
the basis that it is in manifest disregard for the law when the award 
“conflict[s] with [the] governing law, as set forth in the constitution, a 
statute, or case law.”194 
An illustration of an arbitrator committing a manifest disregard of 
the law is Orlowski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.195  
In Orlowski, an insured submitted a claim under her uninsured motorist 
 
191.  Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2011 WI App 14, ¶ 8, 331 Wis. 2d 
188, 795 N.W.2d 777. 
192.  Id. (quoting City of Madison v. Madison Prof’l Police Officers Ass’n, 144 Wis. 2d 
576, 586, 425 N.W.2d 8, 11 (1988)). 
193.  Racine Cnty. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Dist. 10, 2008 WI 
70, ¶ 33, 310 Wis. 2d 508, 751 N.W.2d 312; Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 2011 WI App 14, ¶ 8; 
Breen v. Winkel, No. 95-2677, 1996 WL 252962, at *3, 202 Wis. 2d 651, 551 N.W.2d 64 (Ct. 
App. May 14, 1996) (unpublished table decision); Lukowski v. Dankert, 178 Wis. 2d 110, 115, 
503 N.W.2d 15, 17 (Ct. App. 1993); City of Madison v. Local 311, 133 Wis. 2d 186, 191, 394 
N.W.2d 766, 769 (Ct. App. 1986). 
194.  Racine Cnty., 2008 WI 70, ¶ 34; see Baldwin–Woodville Area Sch. Dist. v. W. Cent. 
Educ. Ass’n—Baldwin Woodville Unit, 2009 WI 51, ¶ 24, 317 Wis. 2d 691, 766 N.W.2d 591; 
Sharp v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 81-1648, 1982 WL 172066, at *2, 107 Wis. 2d 
747, 322 N.W.2d 700 (Ct. App. May 17, 1982) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
195.  2012 WI 21, 339 Wis. 2d 1, 810 N.W.2d 775. 
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coverage after exhausting the policy limits against an underinsured 
motorist.196  The claim was submitted to an arbitration panel, and the 
panel “precluded Orlowski from recovering . . . the value of medical 
expenses that were written off by her medical provider.”197  The basis of 
the arbitrators’ ruling was that the collateral source rule did not apply to 
uninsured motorist cases.198  The collateral source rule “provides that ‘a 
plaintiff’s recovery cannot be reduced by payments or benefits from 
other sources.’”199  The policies underlying the collateral source rule are 
that the tortfeasor should pay the full cost of his wrongful conduct, the 
aggrieved party should be fully compensated, and the insured should 
receive the full benefit of the premiums paid.200  The court concluded 
that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law by not applying the 
collateral source rule to Orlowski’s recovery.201 
By comparison, in Pegues v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co.,202 
an insured was involved in an accident and claimed that another vehicle 
hit his car from behind and pushed his vehicle into the accident.203  The 
insured’s claim that a third vehicle was involved in the accident caused 
the insurance company to seek to preserve the insured’s vehicle for a 
subsequent inspection to determine if the insured’s vehicle was damaged 
in the rear.204  Unfortunately, the insurance company erroneously 
released the insured’s vehicle from custody before any inspection, and it 
was subsequently repaired.205  The arbitration panel subsequently ruled 
against the insured on his claim that his vehicle was damaged from the 
rear.206  On appeal to the circuit court, the insured argued that the 
arbitration panel committed a manifest disregard of the law because it 
failed to apply the presumption of spoilage law that any damaged or 
destroyed evidence would have yielded evidence detrimental to the one 
 
196.  Id. ¶ 2. 
197.  Id. 
198.  Id. ¶ 3. 
199.  Id. ¶ 18 (quoting Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ¶ 29, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 620 
N.W.2d 201). 
200.  Id. 
201.  Id. ¶ 40. 
202.  Pegues v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. 2008AP1500, 2009 WL 454672, 2009 WI App 
41, 316 Wis. 2d 774, 766 N.W.2d 242 (Feb. 25, 2009) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
203.  Id. ¶ 2. 
204.  Id. ¶ 4. 
205.  Id. 
206.  Id. ¶ 5. 
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who damaged or destroyed the evidence (the insurance company).207  
The court, however, noted that the presumption arising from spoilage 
only occurs when the evidence is deliberately or intentionally destroyed 
or damaged.208  The court upheld the panel’s decision because the 
evidence was destroyed as a result of the insurance company’s 
negligence, not any egregious conduct.209  Therefore, there was no 
manifest disregard of the law by the panel. 
Occasionally, an arbitrator will be faced with conflicting legal 
precedent.  Where there are conflicting positions or unsettled law, the 
arbitrator does not commit a manifest disregard of the law by choosing 
to follow one of the contrary positions.210  There is no manifest disregard 
of the law where “substantial authority sustains the arbitrator’s 
assumption as to the law.”211  This is true whether the court agrees with 
the arbitrator’s assumption or not.212  Where the courts were split on 
whether Wisconsin Statutes section 100.18 could be applied to a 
commercial contract dispute (as opposed to a consumer dispute), the 
arbitrator was free to choose either position without committing a 
manifest disregard of the law.213  Similarly, where an arbitrator awarded 
emotional distress damages for a non-traumatic economic injury, the 
award was upheld against a claim that the damage award was a manifest 
disregard of the law because the courts were split on the issue.214 
Sometimes, there is simply no established law for the arbitrator to 
evaluate.  In Lukowski v. Dankert,215 the injured party was involved in a 
traffic accident and was thrown from the vehicle.216  The aggrieved party 
was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of the injury.217  The matter was 
 
207.  Id. ¶ 9. 
208.  Id. ¶ 10. 
209.  Id. ¶ 12. 
210.  Winkelman v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 2005 WI App 25, ¶¶ 12–13, 279 Wis. 2d 335, 693 
N.W.2d 756. 
211.  City of Madison v. Local 311, 133 Wis. 2d 186, 191, 394 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Ct. App. 
1986); see Grambow v. Associated Dental Servs., Inc., No. 94-1735, 1996 WL 5638, at *4, 199 
Wis. 2d 522, 546 N.W.2d 578 (Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1996) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
212.  Local 311, 133 Wis. 2d at 191. 
213.  Id. 
214.  Breen v. Winkel, No. 95-2677, 1996 WL 252962, at *3, 202 Wis. 2d 651, 551 N.W.2d 
64 (Ct. App. May 14, 1996) (unpublished table decision). 
215.  184 Wis. 2d 142, 515 N.W.2d 883 (1994). 
216.  Id. at 146. 
217.  Id. 
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referred to an arbitration panel for resolution.218  No expert testimony 
was provided with regard to the injured party’s comparative negligence 
as a result of not wearing a seatbelt.219  Nevertheless, the panel by a vote 
of 2–1 allocated forty percent negligence to the injured party because 
she was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of the accident.220  The 
dissenting arbitrator argued that expert testimony was required before 
any comparative negligence could be allocated to the injured party.221  
Therefore, in the absence of such testimony, no comparative negligence 
should have been allocated to the injured party.  Upon submission of 
the panel’s decision to the court for confirmation, the trial court agreed 
with the dissenting arbitrator and concluded that the panel’s award was 
a manifest disregard of the law.222  The generally accepted law in 
Wisconsin is that expert testimony is required to allocate comparative 
negligence for the failure to wear a seat belt.223  However, all the cases 
that have applied the general rule were cases where the injured person 
was injured inside the vehicle.224  On appeal, the appeals court noted 
that the arbitration panel did discuss the generally accepted rule that 
requires expert testimony to allocate comparative negligence for failure 
to wear a seat belt.225  But the appeals court concluded that those cases 
were not applicable because the injured party in this matter was ejected 
from the vehicle.226  The appeals court did not find that the arbitration 
panel committed any manifest disregard of the law.227  Rather, the 
appeals court concluded that the panel distinguished the current case 
from the existing case law and, thereby, was free to fill in the gap in the 
existing law.228  The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed because the 
panel considered the relevant law and the distinction made by the panel 
was not precluded by any case law or statute.229  Similarly, where there 
were no generally accepted accounting principles applicable to valuing 
certain financial assets, the arbitrators did not commit a manifest 
 
218.  Id. at 147.  
219.  Id. 
220.  Id. 
221.  Id. 
222.  Id. at 148. 
223.  Id. 
224.  Id. at 149. 
225.  Id. at 154. 
226.  Id.  
227.  Id. at 148. 
228.  Id. at 154. 
229.  Id. 
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disregard of the law where they “were guided by their professional 
experience and the . . . underlying principles” to the contract in 
rendering an award.230 
C. Against Public Policy 
An award that violates a strong public policy will be vacated,231 if the 
public policy is clearly defined.232 
The public policy exception to the general rule of judicial 
deference [is] . . . narrowly construed and limited to situations 
where the public policy “is well defined and dominant . . . .  
[Public policy] is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and 
legal precedents and not from general considerations of 
supposed public interests.”233 
In other words, public policy is not to be found in the mind of the 
beholder. 
There are a number of cases that illustrate when public policy is 
clearly defined.  In Sands v. Menard, Inc.,234 Menard, Inc. had hired Ms. 
Sands as their general counsel.235  Thereafter, Menard terminated Sands, 
and Sands sued Menard for wrongful termination.236  The parties agreed 
to submit the matter to arbitration.237  At the conclusion of the 
arbitration hearing, “the panel ordered that Sands be reinstated” to her 
general counsel position.238  Menard refused reinstatement, and Ms. 
Sands sought to compel compliance by confirming the arbitration award 
with the circuit court.239  Conversely, Menard sought to vacate the award 
on the basis that the award was against public policy because the 
 
230.  Grambow v. Associated Dental Servs., Inc., No. 94-1735, 1996 WL 5638, at *3, 199 
Wis. 2d 522, 546 N.W.2d 578 (Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1996) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
231.  Sands v. Menard, Inc., 2010 WI 96, ¶¶ 2, 50, 328 Wis. 2d 647, 787 N.W.2d 384; 
Fortney v. Sch. Dist. of W. Salem, No. 80-1447, 1981 WL 139207, at *5, 104 Wis. 2d 737, 313 
N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1981) (unpublished table decision). 
232.  Breen v. Winkel, No. 95-2677, 1996 WL 252962, at *2, 202 Wis. 2d 651, 551 N.W.2d 
64 (Ct. App. May 14, 1996) (unpublished table decision). 
233.  Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2011 WI App 14, ¶ 14, 331 Wis. 
2d 188, 795 N.W.2d 777 (quoting Sands, 2010 WI 96, ¶ 50). 
234.  2010 WI 96. 
235.  Id. ¶ 4. 
236.  Id. ¶ 1. 
237.  Id. ¶ 20. 
238.  Id. ¶ 26. 
239.  Id. ¶ 29. 
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attorney–client relationship was irretrievably broken.240  The circuit 
court “confirmed the arbitration award in its entirety.”241  On further 
appeal, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court vacated the arbitration 
award.242  The court noted that a public policy violation must be clear, 
and the particular public policy must be well-defined and dominant.243  
The court found that “an attorney’s ethical obligations, particularly the 
attorney’s duty of loyalty . . . under . . . the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, embody the strong public policy of the State of Wisconsin.”244  
As such, the court concluded that the arbitration award violated public 
policy because it “order[ed] the reinstatement of an attorney where 
[the] reinstatement would clearly lead to a violation of the attorney’s 
ethical obligations.”245  In the court’s opinion, the arbitrators’ award 
would “force[] an attorney to represent a client” where there has been a 
“complete disintegration of mutual goodwill, trust, and loyalty” between 
the parties.246 
Another illustration of clearly defined public policy is Kadlec v. 
Kadlec.247  In Kadlec, a father and son were business partners “in a 
number of business ventures.”248  One of the businesses was “a 
community based residential facility in Iowa.”249  Subsequently, the 
parties decided to dissolve their business relationships.250  As part of the 
dissolution process, the parties agreed to submit any matters that they 
could not amicably resolve to arbitration.251  As part of the dissolution 
process, the father “signed an exclusive listing contract with a Wisconsin 
real estate broker . . . to sell” the community-based residential facility in 
Iowa.252  Thereafter, the property was sold in Iowa, and the father paid 
his one-half of the real estate commission to the Wisconsin relator, but 
the son refused to pay.253  In order to force the son to pay his one-half of 
 
240.  Id. 
241.  Id. 
242.  Id. ¶ 70. 
243.  Id. ¶ 50. 
244.  Id. ¶ 49. 
245.  Id. 
246.  Id.  ¶ 52. 
247.  2004 WI App 84, 272 Wis. 2d 373, 679 N.W.2d 914. 
248.  Id. at ¶ 2. 
249.  Id. 
250.  Id. 
251.  Id. 
252.  Id. 
253.  Id. at ¶ 4. 
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the real estate commission, the father sought an order from an arbitrator 
ordering the son to pay.254  The arbitrator issued an award ordering the 
son to pay his share of the commission, and the circuit court affirmed 
the order.255  The court of appeals, however, vacated the arbitrator’s 
award.256  The court noted that both Wisconsin and Iowa have specific 
statutes requiring a realtor to have a license in its state before a 
commission can be paid for real estate services in that state.257  More 
particularly, those statutes require that a real estate broker prove he is 
licensed in the particular state where the services are rendered.258  The 
public policy underlying the licensing requirements is to establish 
competency in each state as each state defines it.259  The arbitrator’s 
award essentially required the son to pay a real estate commission to a 
Wisconsin realtor for the sale of property in Iowa.260  As such, the 
arbitrator’s award violated the strong public policy emanating from each 
state’s licensing laws, therefore requiring that the arbitrator’s award be 
vacated.261 
Conversely, where the public policy is not clearly defined, the courts 
will defer to the arbitrator’s judgment and not vacate the arbitrator’s 
award on a supposed public policy basis.  In City of Madison v. 
AFSCME,262 the city ordered several city employees not to report for 
duty on a holiday.263  The union objected to the city’s order on the basis 
that the parties had a past practice that permitted employees to decide if 
they wished to work on a holiday.264  When the matter was submitted to 
arbitration, the arbitrator ruled that the past practice between the 
parties was part of their contractual arrangement and the city had 
violated the parties’ agreement.265  The city petitioned the circuit court 
to vacate the award on the ground that it violated the public policy that 
 
254.  Id. 
255.  Id. 
256.  Id. at ¶ 14. 
257.  Id. ¶ 9; see also WIS. STAT. § 452.20 (2013–2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 543B.30 
(West 2011). 
258.  Kadlec, 2004 WI App 84, ¶ 9; see also WIS. STAT. § 452.20; IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 543B.30. 
259.  Kadlec, 2004 WI App 84, ¶ 12. 
260.  Id. ¶ 13. 
261.  Id. ¶ 14. 
262.  124 Wis. 2d 298, 369 N.W.2d 759 (Ct. App. 1985). 
263.  Id. at 300. 
264.  Id. 
265.  Id. 
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a city has complete control of its fiscal policies.266  The circuit court 
vacated the arbitrator’s award on the basis of that public policy.267  The 
appeals court, however, reversed the circuit court and reinstated the 
arbitrator’s award.268  The appeals court noted that “[c]ourts should 
proceed cautiously when making public policy determinations.”269  As 
such, the court reasoned that, “in the absence of evidence as to the 
exigency of the city’s financial condition,” it was reluctant to overturn 
the arbitrator’s award on the basis of public policy.270 
The courts will give the arbitrator significant latitude in specifying a 
particular remedy, provided the arbitrator acknowledges the public 
policy applicable to the situation.  The courts note that an arbitrator is 
free to be innovative in directing a particular remedy, provided the 
remedy is consistent with the parties’ agreement and public policy.271  
Even where the arbitrator’s awards are significantly different on 
essentially the same factual pattern, the courts have upheld the awards 
provided the arbitrators acknowledged the public policy involved in the 
circumstance.  For example, in Cedarburg Education Association v. 
Cedarburg Board of Education,272 a public school teacher had viewed 
“adult images” on the school’s computer system in violation of the 
school’s computer policy.273  As a result, the school district terminated 
the teacher’s employment.274  The union objected to the termination on 
the basis that the discharge was not for just cause.275  The parties agreed 
to submit the matter to binding arbitration.276  The arbitrator concluded 
that the single violation by the teacher did not warrant termination and 
ordered the teacher’s reinstatement.277  The school board refused to 
 
266.  Id. at 300–01. 
267.  Id. at 301. 
268.  Id. at 306. 
269.  Id. at 305 (quoting Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 573, 335 
N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
270.  Id. at 305–06. 
271.  Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, No. 84-1681, 1985 Wisc. 
App. LEXIS 3799, at *9, 127 Wis. 2d 561, 378 N.W.2d 296 (Oct. 10, 1985) (unpublished table 
decision). 
272.  No. 2007AP852, 2008 WL 2812714, 2008 WI App 135, 313 Wis. 2d 831, 756 N.W.2d 
809 (Wis. Ct. App. July 23, 2008) (unpublished table decision). 
273.  Id. ¶ 3. 
274.  Id. ¶ 1. 
275.  Id. 
276.  Id. ¶ 2. 
277.  Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
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reinstate the teacher, and the union filed a complaint in circuit court to 
enforce the arbitration award.278  The circuit court vacated the 
arbitrator’s award on the basis that the teacher’s immoral conduct was 
an automatic ground for termination.279  On appeal, the appeals court 
agreed that a court may vacate an arbitrator’s award when it violates a 
strong public policy.280  Further, the appeals court acknowledged that 
Wisconsin has a statutory definition of immoral conduct for the 
protection of students, which is evidence of a strong public policy.281  
Therefore, the appeals court vacated the arbitrator’s award on the basis 
that it violated the strong public policy against immoral conduct in 
schools and affirmed the circuit court’s order terminating the teacher’s 
employment.282 
Conversely, in Middleton Education Association v. Middleton–Cross 
Plains Area School District,283 a number of teachers were disciplined for 
“viewing and sharing on school computers emails containing sexually 
explicit pictures and inappropriate jokes.”284  The school district 
terminated one of the teachers and the union challenged the discharge 
in arbitration.285  The arbitrator reduced the employee’s termination to a 
suspension.286  Thereafter, the union applied to the court for 
confirmation of the award, and the school district moved to vacate it.287  
The circuit court confirmed the arbitrator’s award.288  On appeal, the 
court presumed “a strong public policy against teachers viewing sexually 
explicit materials in school or on school-issued computers.”289  The 
school district argued that “any discipline short of termination . . . fails 
to give sufficient weight to the presumed public policy.”290  The court of 
 
278.  Id. ¶ 4. 
279.  Id. 
280.  Id. ¶ 10. 
281.  Id. ¶ 14; see WIS. STAT. § 115.31(1)(c) (2013–2014) (“‘Immoral conduct’ means 
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282.  Cedarburg, 2008 WL 2812714, ¶ 21. 
283.  No. 2012AP2395, 2013 WL 4556288, 2013 WI App 115, 350 Wis. 2d 5057, 838 
N.W.2d 137 (Aug. 29, 2013) (per curiam, unpublished table decision). 
284.  Id. ¶ 1. 
285.  Id. ¶¶ 2–3. 
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289.  Id. ¶ 8. 
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appeals, however, disagreed with the school district.291  The court noted 
that the school district’s argument was not supported by any published 
case law, nor would it be fair to terminate only one employee without 
also terminating others “who also viewed sexually explicit material in 
school or on school computers.”292  In other words, there may be a 
number of remedies available to an arbitrator as long as the arbitrator 
honors the strong public policy.   
Finally, even though an employee’s conduct clearly violates public 
policy and justifies termination, the employee may be reinstated if the 
employer also breached the contract.  In Racine Unified School District 
v. Service Employees’ International Union, Local 152,293 an employee of 
the school district smoked marijuana with a student.294  Upon learning of 
the incident, the school suspended the employee and initiated a 
disciplinary hearing.295  Upon the conclusion of the disciplinary hearing, 
the employee was terminated.296  The hearing officer at the disciplinary 
hearing conducted all aspects of the hearing, including “interview[ing] 
[the] witnesses, decid[ing] what charges to bring, issu[ing] the charges, 
determin[ing] which witnesses were to be called at the hearing, 
presid[ing] at the hearing, and ma[king] the decision to terminate” the 
employee.297  The union objected to the lack of due process exhibited in 
the disciplinary hearing and sought arbitration of the matter.298  “The 
arbitrator found that the employee did smoke marijuana with the 
student and that . . . [his conduct was] just cause . . . for termination.”299  
The arbitrator, however, further found that because the employee was 
denied basic due process rights the employee’s penalty was reduced 
from termination to a one-year suspension without pay.300  “The district 
moved to vacate the arbitration award . . . .”301  The circuit court vacated 
the award on the basis that it violated the strong public policy of 
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“protecting students from drug use in the schools.”302  On appeal, 
however, the court reversed the circuit court’s decision and reinstated 
the arbitrator’s award.303  The court reasoned that the arbitrator’s order 
reinstating the employee after a one-year suspension without pay was 
justified in order to remedy the school district’s breach of its obligation 
to provide basic due process rights during the disciplinary process.304  
VIII.CONCLUSION 
Once an arbitration award has been issued, the prevailing party 
normally seeks to have the award confirmed by a court.  At the same 
time, the disappointed party has the right to move the court to vacate 
the award.  There are five grounds recognized by the courts for vacating 
an arbitrator’s award. 
First, the moving party can raise substantive arbitrability.  There are 
two different types of substantive arbitrability.  One is to prove that the 
parties never entered into a contract to arbitrate their dispute or that the 
contract they did enter into is avoidable for any of the usual contract 
defenses.  Two, the disappointed party can challenge the scope of the 
arbitration clause upon which the other party maintains that their 
dispute must be arbitrated. 
The second ground is to establish that the prevailing party used 
some corruption, fraud, or undue means to corrupt the arbitration 
process.  In addition to proving the improper conduct by the other party, 
it must also be established that there is a nexus between the improper 
conduct and the award and that the improper conduct was not 
discoverable prior to the award. 
Third, an award will be vacated where it can be shown that the 
arbitrator was evidently partial.  The third ground primarily focuses on 
what is required to be disclosed by the arbitrator prior to being 
approved as the arbitrator.  It is much preferred to have issues of 
impartiality resolved by the parties before the arbitration, rather than by 
a court after the arbitration.  In addition, if a disclosure is made prior to 
the arbitration, it can no longer be used as a basis for vacatur after the 
arbitration. 
Fourth, arbitrator misconduct in conducting the arbitration is a 
ground for vacatur.  There are a multitude of issues that arise here, 
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including the arbitrator’s failure to record the hearing, denying 
adjournment requests, failing to admit evidence, failing to provide a 
reasoned award, and others.  These are difficult issues where the 
arbitrator must balance competing interests, and the failure to exercise 
appropriate discretion will result in a vacatur. 
Finally, the last ground is where the arbitrator has exceeded his 
authority by misusing his power.  There are three ways that an arbitrator 
exceeds his authority.  First, the arbitrator can commit a perverse 
misconstruction of the parties’ contract.  In other words, an arbitrator 
can interpret the parties’ contract, but he cannot amend, modify, or add 
to it.  Although there are many issues that arise under the “perverse 
misconstruction” argument, two of the most common ones are the 
ability of an arbitrator to award attorney’s fees and punitive damages.  
Second, an arbitrator exceeds his authority when he manifestly 
disregards the law.  This occurs when the arbitrator’s award either 
ignores the law or conflicts with prevailing law.  An arbitrator, however, 
is free to choose between conflicting precedents or fill in the gap if there 
is no precedent.  Finally, the arbitrator cannot issue an award that is 
against public policy.  The public policy, however, must be clearly 
defined by the constitution, a statute, or case law. 
